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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
T H E STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
x • I T J_ J_ p
In the Interest of:

[ v^ase IN o»
>
( 13661

R I C K E Y L E E J A C K S O N , a minor,
Defendant-A ppellant.

Brief of Defendant-Appellant

STATEMENT OF
T H E N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
The State of Utah filed a delinquency petition in
the Second District Juvenile Court charging that (1)
on or about August 21, 1973, at Highway 37, State
of Utah, approximately one mile north of Tooele City
limits, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203
(1) (b), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 1973,
said child intending to cause serious bodily injury committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, to-wit:
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

he shot Tito Alfonso Suazo which caused the death of
Tito Alfonso Suazo; (2) on or about August 21,
1973, at Tooele County, State of Utah, in violation
of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 103(1) (b), Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended 1973, said child did intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to Paul
Mondragon by use of a deadly weapon, and (3) on or
about August 21, 1973, at Tooele County, State of
Utah, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 103
(1) (b), Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended
1973, said child did intentionally or knowingly cause
bodily injury to Elmer Gonzales by use of a deadly
weapon.
In a trial without a jury, before Judge Regnal
Garff, defendant was not found guilty of second degree
murder, but was found guilty of manslaughter [R-310]
in regard to allegation # 1 , and was found guilty as
charged of counts 2 and 3. Defendant now appeals
the decree of the juvenile court pursuant to Section
55-10-112, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended,
which states in part:
"55-10-112. Appeal to Supreme Court from
order, decree or judgment of juvenile court—
Procedure.—An appeal to the Supreme Court
may be taken from any order, decree, or judgment of the juvenile court."
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT
On October 30, 1973, Honorable Regnal Garff,
Jr., found defendant guilty of one count of man2
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slaughter (what would have been voluntary manslaughter under the old Code) and two counts of aggravated assault (formerly assault with a deadly
weapon). Disposition of the case was set for December
5, 1973, at which time defendant was ordered committed to the State Industrial School.
Following Notice of Appeal, the Court granted a
Petition for a Certificate of Probable Cause and released defendant without bail to his guardian, pending
the outcome of this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant, Rickey Lee Jackson, pursuant to
Section 55-10-112 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as
amended, seeks a reversal of the decision of the juvenile court finding him guilty of manslaughter and two
counts of aggravated assault.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 21, 1973, appellant and three companions, Jerry Caldwell, Kenny Martinez and Steven
Spafford, were driving north on main street from
Tooele to the Motor-Vu Drive-in near Stansbury Park
[R. 197, 235]. As the appellant's automobile passed
the Dairy Queen, one of the boys in the appellant's car
called out to a friend [R-197, 235]. Another car, containing the deceased, Tito Alfonso Suazo, and his
3
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friends, was behind appellant's car and for unknown
reasons began to tailgate appellant's car as it continued
down H i g h w a y 36 [R-198, 243]. The Suazo car also
contained E a r l Mondragen, E l m e r Gonzales and P a u l
Mondragen [R-114]. Suazo was 23 and weighed approximately forty pounds more than appellant [R-230,
275]. The decedent's car tried many times to pass appellant's car but the oncoming traffic wouldn't permit
it [R-205]. Eventually as these cars were proceeding
north at about fifty miles per hour, Suazo passed appellant's car [R-198] and immediately slowed down,
causing a small collission [R-214, 258]. Finally, the
Suazo car skidded to a stop [R-103] causing another
collision which damaged the front of the appellant's
automobile [R-199].
A s the appellant was t r y i n g unsuccessfully to
start his car [R-244], Suazo and his friends, who had
been drinking, [R-85, 252, 130, 161], lighted from their
car and came towards the appellant's automobile [R117, 209, 245]. Suazo grabbed appellant [R-210, 203]
by the neck [R-244, 268] through his open car window
and appellant, having a .22 pistol in his glove compartment from rabbit hunting the day before [R-266] fired
one shot [R-244]. Suazo kept strangling and so appellant fired another shot [R-246, 268, 269]. Appellant
got out of the car and told the others to get out of
there because he didn't want to hurt them too [R-246,
271]. One of Suazo's friends then grabbed appellant
from behind and held in a "full-nelson" [R-177, 247,
248].

4
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As one began to approach him [R-249] appellant
shot that person [R-247, 249, 250] and then turned the
gun to his own side and shot his assailant [R-250].
Appellant then flagged down another car [R-76] [R251] and went directly to the Tooele City Police Department for help [R-77].

ARGUMENT
POINT I: SELF-DEFENSE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR D E F E N D A N T S CONDUCT
AS A M A T T E R O F L A W W A S E S T A B L I S H E D DURING T H E TRIAL.
Appellant contends the language of Utah Code
Annotated 76-2-402, 1953 as amended, entitled "Force
in defense of person" clearly justifies the actions of
appellant in regard to the charge of manslaughter and
the charges of aggravated assault. The statute in the
Code states:
"76-2-402. Force in defense of person — (1) a
person is justified in threatening or using force
against another when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such
other's imminent use or unlawful force; however, a person is justified in using force which is
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury only if he reasonably believes that the
force is necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or a third person, or to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony."
[emphasis added].
5
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This statute is part of a new Criminal Code enacted by the Utah Legislature which became effective
on July 1, 1973. The former statute on self-defense
was Utah Code Annotated 76-30-10, entitled: "Justifiable homicide by others". The new statute is noteworthy in that it expands the scope of justifiable homicide to the defense of third persons against another's
imminent use of unlawful force. The old statute, Utah
Code Annotated 76-30-10(3) states that homicide was
justifiable:
"(3) When committed in the lawful defense of
such person, or of a wife, husband, parent, child,
master, mistress or servant of such person, when
there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design
to commit a felony or to do some great bodily
injury and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished."
Under this previous statute, therefore, appellant
would not have been justified in using the force he
used if his intention had been to defend his three other
friends in his car. Significantly, the new statute permits him to defend himself as well as "a third person",
other than the notion of the newly created justification
to defend any third person, the new statute, as it applies to the instant case does not materially differ from
the old one, but seems to codify the Utah law of selfdefense as it has been interpreted by the courts. One
is, therefore, justified in applying case law which developed prior to July, 1973, to actions tried under the
self-defense statute, Utah Code Annotated 76-2-402,
1953 as amended.
6
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According to the weight of the evidence, or at least
a fair interpretation, the following is a description of
events of the evening of A u g u s t 21, 1973, from the
standpoint of the appellant, a sixteen year old student
at Tooele H i g h School [R-234]. Appellant, Rickey
Lee Jackson, and three of his high school friends decide to go to a drive-in movie. They obtain permission from their parents [R-196] and proceed northward along Tooele's Main Street [R-196]. They had
not been drinking [R-112]. U p o n leaving the main part
of town, a car load of Chicanos, whom they did not
know personally [R-237, 238] but knew of, begin to
tailgate them [R-243L A s the Chicano car passes, A p pellant and his friends hear bottles or rocks hit their
car [R-198, 204, 205, 243, 254, 256]. Immediately upon
passing, the Chicano car slows [R-258] and then skids
to a stop [R-199, 206] and its driver, seven years older
than appellant and forty pounds heavier [R-230, 275]
j u m p s out and hurries toward appellant [R-117]. Suazo
grabs appellant [R-203] around the neck and attempts
to strangle him [R-244]. Appellant testified and the
evidence was unmistakable, that Suazo and his friends
had been drinking [R-116, 125, 130, 131, 161, 252].
Terrified by his assailant and remembering stories of
other attacks of Chicanos on whites in the Tooele area
[R-240, 276, 277], appellant grabs a .22 pistol from
the glove compartment [he had been hunting rabbits
with it the day before [R-266] and shoots Suazo [R244]. Suazo continues to squeeze appellant's neck and
so appellant shoots again [R-246]. Appellant then
j u m p s out of the car and tells everyone to leave [R7
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246], that he does not want to hurt them [R-271], but
is attacked again [R-247, 211] from the rear and thereafter that assailant and another of Suazo's Chicano
friends are wounded with shots [R-249, 250].
Although the prosecution introduced evidence to
the effect that appellant began shooting at Suazo before Suazo had even touched Appellant, the blood on
the outside of the door of Jackson's car shown in a
photograph marked State's Exhibit #7 renders such
an interpretation highly improbable. Even the State's
witness, Jerry Caldwell, who was in the appellant's car,
testified that he saw someone grabbing appellant [R209] and the shooting. The appellant's car was approached on the passenger side by other occupants of
Suazo's automobile [R-244, 245].
Applying these facts to the Utah Code Annotated
76-2-402, it is unmistakable that the Appellant acted
in self-defense — both in defense of himself and in defense of his three friends who were riding with him.
The statute states that a person is justified in using
force which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he reasonably believes that
the force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily
injury to himself or a third person, or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.
Jackson testified that he believed he was in danger
of serious bodily injury [R-253L Upon cross-examination, appellant further clarified what he meant by
serious bodily injury [R-277, 278]:

8
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"MR. W A T S O N
(COUNTY
ATTORN E Y ) : What kind of harm did you feel that
you were going to receive ?
A. ( J A C K S O N ) : Maybe knocked out, or beat
up, or have Xs carved on me, or just get beat up.
Q. Get beat up generally.
A. Get my car smashed up.
Q. What fear did you think was going to come
to the occupants of your car
A. They'd probably get it as bad as I did."
Although Utah Code Annotated 76-2-402, 1953
as amended, says that a person is justified in using
deadly force if he reasonably believes such force is
necessary to prevent serious bodily injury or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony, the Code nowhere defines what is meant by the term "forcible
felony".
As a practical matter, it seems obvious that the
legislature probably intended that "forcible felony" be
interpreted to mean just what its words signify. Thus,
"forcible felony" would mean any felony in which some
degree of force was manifest. For example, mayhem is
an act in which force is used and which can result in a
felony charge.
In addition to this logical interpretation, an analysis of the derivation of the current self-defense
statute renders useful information in helping to define
what is meant by "forcible felony". Utah Code Annotated 76-2-402, the statute in question, was derived

9
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from the Georgia Criminal Code and appears in the
Utah Code as an exact duplicate of the Georgia Provision [See Ga. Code Ann. 26-902]. Significantly, the
Georgia Code does define "forcible felony", Georgia
Code Annotated 26-401 (f) states:
" 'Forcible felony' means any felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence against any person", [emphasis added]
Therefore, since Jackson believed [and the State
presented no evidence whatever to dispel such a belief]
that he would be beat up, or carved up with a knife,
it is reasonable to conclude the Appellant was defending himself and his friends from the commission of a
forcible felony. A sixteen year old high school boy
could reasonably conclude that when he is being
strangled by a twenty-three year old male Chicano
who weighs forty more pounds than himself, who had
been drinking and throwing bottles at his car, he is in
danger of serious bodily injury, or of a "forcible felony". In weighing the evidence, one is compelled to
believe appellant's corroborated testimony. Deputy
Sheriff Jones, of the Tooele County Sheriff's Office
testified at [R-21] that appellant gave the unsolicited
remark when he arrived at the Sheriff's Office " H e
had me around the throat, what was I supposed to do?"
This remark isn't the result of a scheming mind contriving some kind of justification, but a spontaneous
utterance of a boy at a time nearly contemporaneous
with the event itself.

10
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The only element of the defense of justification
which remains to be fulfilled is the question of whether
or not appellant reasonably believed that the force he
used was necessary. Fortunately, the Utah Supreme
Court has dealt with this issue of reasonableness in the
context of a claim of self-defense.
In State v. Terrell, 55 Utah 314, 186 P . 108
[1919], where defendant was convicted of assault with
a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm, regarding the necessity of defense, the court stated:
". . . the necessity need not be real; it need be
only reasonably apparent, and the resistance
offered in good faith, upon reasonable grounds
of belief that the invasion of some right accorded
by the statute is being made by the offender . . . "
Id. at 111.
In the case of the appellant, then, one does not
judge by hindsight whether in the given circumstances
the amount of force used in defense of oneself was reasonable or not — the necessity to defend oneself need
be only reasonably apparent and offered in good faith.
In State v. Turner, 95 Utah 129, 79 P.2d 46
[1938], defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The Utah Supreme Court discussed at
length and with enlightenment the justification of
self-defense. That Court stated:
"There must generally be some act or demonstration on the part of the deceased which induced a
reasonable belief on the part of the defendant
that he was about to lose his life or suffer some
11
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great bodily harm." [or be the victim of a forcible felony under the present statute] Id. at 51
Again, the weight of the evidence reveals that appellant, Rickey Lee Jackson, was being strangled. A s
to whether such an act would justify a reasonable belief on the p a r t of the defendant, the Turner court continued :
" H e (defendant) might have awaited until he
received great bodily harm, but if one who is
attacked must restrain himself until subsequent
events determine whether the attack will result
fatally or in grievous bodily harm, then the right
of self-defense is one in name only. This is not
the law. A person assailed may act upon appearances as they present themselves to him, meet
force with force, and even slay his assailant; and,
though in fact he was not in any actual peril,
yet if the circumstances were such that a reasonable man would be justified in acting as he did,
the slayer will be held blameless." Id. 58, 59
The court further stated:
". . . . a person will not be held responsible
civilly or criminally if he acts in self-defense,
from real or honest convictions induced by reasonable evidence, although he may be mistaken
as to the existence of actual danger." Id. 59
Clearly, appellant, Jackson, was not the aggressor
in the instant case. There was no evidence whatsoever
presented at trial that appellant or any of his friends
approached the Suazo car before Suazo and his friends
j u m p e d out and headed for appellant and his friends.
U n d e r all evidence before any shot was fired, whether
12
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or not appellant was in fact in danger of death or serious bodily injuries, he was entitled to decide based upon
appearances as they presented themselves at the
moment. H e did: that he and his friends were in
danger. Finally, a forcible felony, i.e., attempted
strangulation of appellant, did actually take place.
U n d e r terms of U t a h Code Annotated 76-2-402
then, appellant was unquestionably justified in using
force which was likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury to protect himself. W h e n he was out of the car
and was again attacked from the rear, he again was
entitled to defend himself.
A s recently as 1944, the U t a h Supreme Court has
reiterated its reasoning in Turner.
I n State v. Law,
106 U t a h 196, 147 P.2d 324 [1944], where a defendant
was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the court
summarized the basic elements of self-defense. I n an
opinion which concurred with the majority, Justify
Larson reasoned:
". . . The element of self-defense, or justifiable
homicide is predicated upon two propositions:
(a) T h a t the circumstances and surroundings
were such that a man might reasonably believe
he was in imminent peril of death or great bodily
injury, (b) T h a t the actor did actually believe
he was in such danger." Id. 329
I t is the contention of the appellant that the evidence
in the case at hand is so conclusive that every reasonable mind must say the force employed was necessary
t o defend against aggression. Therefore, as a matter
13
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of law, the appellant was justified in his actions in defending himself and his friends from the forcible felonies. The question of whether appellant could reasonably have concluded that a forcible felony wras about
to be committed is a factual question which, in the instant case, was left to the j u d g e to decide. Nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence presented, both by
the state and the defense, appellant contends the trial
court erred as a matter of law and in its interpretation
of the facts.
A s regards the two counts of aggravated assault,
the j u d g e in the juvenile court hearing concluded at a
certain point in the altercation, appellant became the
aggressor, and therefore, U t a h Code Annotated 76-2402(2) (c) became controlling. This statute reads as
follows:
" ( 2 ) A person is not justified in using force
under the circumstances specified in p a r a g r a p h
(1) of this section if he:
(c) W a s the aggressor or was engaged in
a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively
communicates to such other person his intent to do so and the other notwithstanding,
continues or threatens to continue the use of
unlawful force."
There is conflicting evidence as to what occurred
after Suazo was shot. T h e evidence indicates that appellant got out of his car and told the other Chicanos
to get out of there because he did not want to hurt
14
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them, whereupon he was again attacked from the rear
and put in a "full-Nelson" [R-185, 186]. Even Paul
Mondragen, a State's witness and one of those shot,
testified that as Jackson got out of the car, he heard
appellant say, "Get out of here, get out of here." [R176, 182, 183]. This testimony was corroborated by
another State's witness, Jerry Caldwell, who said he
heard appellant say "Get out of here" or "go on" or
"something like that" [R-210, 271]. It is also uncontradicted evidence that appellant did not fire any shots
after the two at Suazo, until he was attacked again.
The conclusion of the trial judge in juvenile Court
that appellant was the aggressor is so offensive to any
fair interpretation of the facts that one is compelled
to wonder why complaints were not brought against the
riders in the Suazo automobile, instead of appellant.
Applying the foregoing evidence to Utah Code
Annotated 76-2-402 (2) (c), it is incredible to conclude
that appellant ever became the aggressor. The statute
states that even if one was the aggressor, which appellant obviously was not, he may still justify defending
himself if he effectively communicates to such other
person his intent to do so. The testimony cited immediately above indicates without doubt the communicated desire to leave his assailants alone, but he was attacked again anyway. The members of the Suazo
party were the aggressors, as was Suazo himself — not
appellant nor his friends.
In State v. Turner, supra, the court dealt with the
effect of one abandoning his intention to inflict injury:
15
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". . . W h e r e , however, a person has in good faith
abandoned his intention to inflict injury on another and is retreating, he is entitled to defend if
pursued and attacked." Id. 60
H e r e , appellant abandoned any intention to inflict
injury further, but was attacked again. H e was, therefore, entitled to defend himself by virtue of U t a h Code
Annotated 76-2-402 (2) ( c ) , and the reasoning of the
U t a h Supreme Court as enunciated in Turner.
I n the instant case, the trial court failed to comprehend the clear meaning of the U t a h statutes dealing
with justification or self-defense.

POINT II: REASONABLE DOUBT
WAS
E S T A B L I S H E D AS A M A T T E R OF FACT.
U t a h Code Annotated 77-31-4, 1953 as amended,
states:
" A defendant in a criminal action is presumed
to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and
in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal."
Appellant respectfully contends that the case presented by the State did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the guilt of the appellant. I n a case where there
is evidence regarding the possibility of self-defense, the
appellant is not required to establish his defense beyond a reasonable doubt. I n State v. Coyle, 41 U t a h
320,126 P . 305, the Court 1 stated:
16
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" U n d e r this section, (regarding self-defense) it
is error to instruct the j u r y that the defendant
is required to establish his defense beyond a reasonable doubt. If his defense creates a reasonable doubt in the mind of the j u r y of his guilt,
he is entitled to an acquittal."
I n the later case of State v. Talarico, 57 U t a h 229,
193 P . 860, the court reiterated its holding in Coyle:
" I n a prosecution for assault with a deadly
weapon, with intent to commit bodily harm, defendant was not required to establish his claim
of self-defense by preponderance of the evidence,
but was entitled to acquittal if on the whole evidence the j u r y entertained a reasonable doubt as
to whether or not he acted in self-defense."
The evidence presented in the instant case without question raises a reasonable doubt as to whether or
not appellant acted in self-defense. I n the trial court,
the j u d g e declared without explanation and in a conelusory fashion, that "the court has rejected the idea
or the defense of self-defense" [R-310]. The j u d g e
added t h a t : " T h e Court is not convinced from the evidence that has been produced that Rickey Jackson reasonably believed that the shooting was necessary to
prevent death or serious bodily injury to him or the
others in his car" [R-310]. These two phrases by the
court are the only ones in the entire record which deal
with the issue of self-defense. I t would appear the
j u d g e thought the defendant had to prove his innocence
through his affirmative defense, beyond a reasonable
doubt, instead of the other way around. F u r t h e r , the
court completely neglects the mention of the notion of
17
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6

'forcible felony", relying solely on appellant's fear of
"death or serious bodily i n j u r y " to himself or his
friends. T h a t the facts show clearly that appellant had
a reasonable fear of Suazo committing a "forcible
felony" has been covered in Point I .
I n State v. Harris, 58 U t a h 331, 199 P.145, the
Court spoke again of the nature of the burden of proof
in establishing self-defense:
" W h e n the defendant offers proof of self-defense, he is entitled to acquittal if he has produced sufficient evidence of his justification to
create in the minds of the j u r y a reasonable
doubt of his guilt of the offense charged."
Appellant contends that as a matter of fact such reasonable doubt was raised, as to create in the mind of
any reasonable j u r y , doubt of defendant's guilt of the
offense charged. E v e n if the trial j u d g e had in his
mind that the defendant was required to sustain the
burden by "preponderance of the evidence", State v.
Talarico, supra, dispels such a notion.
I n view of the possible uprising of the Tooele
Chicano community, had appellant not been convicted
of something, perhaps the way in which the traditional
burden of "beyond a reasonable doubt" was somehow
ignored in the instant case is explicable. Rationalizing
a decision for the sake of political expediency, however,
is not the course of the law. T h e evidence presented in
this case was not complicated or terribly contradictory;
further, the evidence that was in any way contradictory
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was almost consistently voluminous in favor of the appellant.
For example, those who were riding with Suazo,
testified that although they had been drinking, they
had not thrown any empty bottles or cans of beer. [ItI l l , 179]. Yet a witness who lived in a trailer court on
Highway 36, Walter Miner, testified that as two cars
passed the trailer court, a few minutes before the shootings, a bottle struck the driveway going into the trailer
court and broke upon impact [R-101]. The evidence
further indicated that although the Suazo vehicle passengers had purchased two six packs of bottled beer,
there were a number of bottles missing when the cars
were searched after the shootings — meaning that these
bottles were either thrown out of the car, or emptied
in a trash can some where along the way.
Since the judge in a criminal case which is tried in
juvenile court acts as both the judge and jury, the
possibilities for gross unfairness are multiplied. The
comments of the judge in his decision in the juvenile
court hearing indicate confusion as to the burden appellant had to comply with in order to establish his
affirmative defense [R-310].
Appellant submits that a thorough reading of the
record leaves no basis for a conclusion that the appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
POINT I I I : T H E LANGUAGE IN SECTION
76-5-103, U T A H CODE A N N O T A T E D , 1953 A S
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A M E N D E D , IS AMBIGUOUS A N D AS SUCH
DOES NOT D E F I N E T H E COMMISSION OF
A P U B L I C O F F E N S E . TO C H A R G E T H E
D E F E N D A N T W I T H T H E COMMISSION OF
AN O F F E N S E W H I C H IS NOT D E F I N E D IS
CLEARLY VIOLATIVE OF E S T A B L I S H E D
LAW.
In a case presently before the Utah Supreme
Court, State of Utah vs. Vincent Joseph Archulettay
Case No. 13579 this issue has been raised. Appellant
in the instant case submits that the holding of the Utah
Supreme Court in the Archuletta case will be dispositive of this issue for the case at hand as well. If
the District Court is upheld in its ruling, there was no
aggravated assault statute in Utah during the alleged
commission of the aggravated assaults of the appellant,
Rickey Lee Jackson, and therefore, the verdict as to
the two counts of aggravated assault must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the appellant's clear
establishment of sufficient evidence of justification and
self-defense to create a reasonable doubt of appellant's
guilt, the failure of the State to sustain the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the
appellant, appellant requests the decision of the Juv20
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enile Court be overturned and that the appellant be
found not guilty of any of the offenses charged.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT M. McRAE
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
370 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 364-6474
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